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The problem of matching different players represents a well known problem in the area of operational research. A simple and sensible model one can build to face this situation is the stable marriage one. In its traditional formulation [1] [2] [3] one deals with two sets of N players each of whom has an own list of the players of the other set that he/she likes. The first one in the list is the one he/she likes more, the last one is the less liked. It has already been fruitful to apply the ideas of the statistical physics in order to derive some properties of this model. In particular one would be tempted to study how "to optimise" the set of matchings in the system such that to maximise the general satisfaction. Under this respect the stable marriage problem can be considered as a prototype model for the social science and the economy where decision-makers are individuals or companies. They have their own selfish goals to optimise, which are often conflicting. The stable marriage optimization problem does not require the total satisfaction to be the largest possible, but that the resulting state be stable against the egoistic attempts of individuals to improve their situation. This new concept of equilibrium is familiar in game theory where anyone tries to maximise his utility at the same time. This is the concept of Nash equilibrium [4] , where a state is characterised by the stability with respect to the action of any agent. In other words, a state is stable if any change in an agent's strategy is unfavorable for himself. In this paper we use some of the results on the statistical properties of the stable marriage problem as obtained by Ref. [5] [6] . We then generalise the model by introducing amongst the different players lists a correlation that should reduce the arbitrarity in the list compilation. In other words our model refers to a more real world where the beauty or the uglyness does exist and affects in similar way the players lists. In this direction goes also the second generalization that we introduce and study in this paper. We put the players on a lattice and we consider explicitly the effect of distance in their matching.
The marriage problem describes a system where two sets of N persons have to be matched pairwise. In this formulation of the model all the players have to marry. By suitably changing the language of the model, the same situation can be applied to different contexts where two distinct sets have to be matched with the best satisfaction. Just to fix ideas we will use here the more intuitive language of the man-woman matching, to explain the definition of the model. Based on his judgment, each man establishes a wish-list of his desired women, in such a way that the top of the list is the woman he likes more. Women do the same for the men. Following Ref. [5] we assume also that each person's satisfaction depends on the rank of the partner he/she gets to marry. This allows us to regards the rank as a cost function to mimimise. If the top choice is attained, the cost is the least, the bottom choice has the highest cost. We will consider in the following the case where the lists are random but not independently established.
In order to set up the notation let us look at the following example of three men and three women. The preference lists for all persons are shown below. We will use the symbol m i for the i-th man (i = 1, .., N ) and w i to index women, in such a way that a list L(m i ) of man m i can be described as:
If man m 2 marries woman w 3 (the second of his list) we assign to the marriage a cost 2 equal to the rank of his wife. The minimum the cost the greater the satisfaction of the man. It is convenient to introduce a representation of the lists in terms of rankings: We define the matrices F and H for women and men respectively, such that the element f (w i , m j ) denotes the position of a man m j in the list of the woman w i . Equivalently h(m j , w i ) yields the rank of the woman w i in the man m j 's list. A realization of the preference lists is also called an instance and we indicate that as the set {m, w} i of the couples i where i = 1, ..., N . We call a stable matching M = {m, w} i (where i = 1, ..N ) a state where one cannot find a man m and a woman w who are not married but would both prefer to marry each other rather than staying with their respective partners. Such a couple is called a blocking pair. If no such pair exists, the matching is called stable. One can calculate the energy per person, for women and men in a given matching as
where f (w, m) i gives the rank of man m for the woman w in the i-th couple, and where h(m, w) i gives the rank of woman w for the man m in the i-th couple. The energy ǫ(M) = ǫ F (M) + ǫ H (M) is the energy per couple. Here and in the following the subscripts F and H stand for women and men, respectively. To compute one stable state of the system it is usually used the classical Gale-Shapley (GS) algorithm [1] which assigns the role of proposers to the elements of one set, the men say, and of judgers to the elements of the other. The man-oriented GS algorithm starts from a man m making a proposal to the first woman w on his list. If she accepts they get engaged, if she refuses m goes on proposing to the next woman on his list. w accepts a proposal when either she is not engaged or she is engaged with a man m ′ worse than the one proposing (m). In the latter case, m ′ will proceed to the woman following w on his list. When all men have run through their lists proposing until all women are engaged, the algorithm stops and the engagements result in marrings and matching thus reached is a stable matching.
As regards the previous example of a system with N = 3 players, the man-oriented GS algorithm goes as follows: man m 1 proposes to woman w 1 who accepts and they form the pair (m 1 , w 1 ). Then m 2 proposes to w 1 , but she refuses. So man m 2 proposes to woman w 3 and they get married. Finally man m 3 happily marries woman w 2 . This results in the matching M H = {(m 1 , w 1 ), (m 2 , w 3 ), (m 3 , w 2 )}. If the GS algorithm is run by reversing the roles (woman-oriented) to yield the woman-optimal stable matching. In our example, this leads to
The energies for men and women in these matchings are (ǫ H , ǫ F ) = (4/3, 7/3) and (6/3, 5/3) respectively for M H and M F . As extensively studied in the ref. [5] who proposes is always better off than who judges. The man-oriented GS algorithm yields the man-optimal stable matching in the sense that no man can have a better partner in any other stable matching.
All the above results hold in the case that the rank any player assigns to the other sex players are randomly extracted from a uniform distribution. A more realistic situation would apply if the players are characterised by what is commonly indicated by "beauty" that is some of the players have a finite probability to be high in rank in all the opposite sex players lists. We tried to model the intrinsic beauty of players in such a way to generalize the ordinary stable marriage problem that can be derived now as a particular case. For that reason in the new formulation we still have a random contribution in the score a players receives from the opposite sex players. Nevertheless a second contribution in the score formation is given by a parameter weighting the intrinsic properties of the player. In particular we assigned to each man/woman a parameter I m or I w respectively. The score S a woman receives in the opinion of a man is given by S = η mw + U I w
Where η m is a random number belonging to the interval (0, 1) reflecting the personal opinion of man m on woman w. The second term I w is again drawn from the interval (0, 1) and reflects the intrinsic properties of woman w; it stays the same in all the scores for woman w given by every man in the set. U is a parameter to weight the second contribution. At this point all the women have a score for the man m that can now form the list in descending order, that is the lower the score the higher the rank. In this way a small I w represents a nice woman for U >> 1 (where the first contribution plays no role) conversely a value of U = 0 corresponds to the standard stable marriage problem. At this point we run the GS algorithm in order to detect the stable states. As regards the statistical properties of the energy for such states we start by considering the original case where the values of f (w, m) i and h(m, w) i differs each other. This is the first plot present from above in Fig.1 . For this case no difference exists for the different players in the set and the average value of this rank over 1000 different realisation stays more or less the same. This is not the case however when one rank the players in function of their beauty such that the first ones are the more good-looking. At this point the situation dramatically change and the satisfaction now is dependent upon the intrinsic quality of the players. This is evident in the second plot where U is equal to 0.1 and even clearer in the last one where U is equal to 1. It is interesting to note, however, that even if the more beautiful players have by far a larger satisfaction in their matching with respect to the others, the general unsatisfaction in the system increases. As a matter of fact, when the concept of "most beautiful" in the world tends to be the same for everyone it becomes more and more difficult to make more people happy. However, the presence of beauty transforms in a fairer way the GS algorithm that now tends to give the same results regardless the sex. In all the plots of Fig.1 we called "male" those who propose and "female" those who judge. This means that "male" refers to both men in the man-oriented GS algorithm and to women in the woman-oriented GS algorithm. Another way to describe how correlations in lists affect the statistical properties of the stable state, is to consider what is the probability P (R) that a player will have a partner of rank R in his/her list. If in the case of uncorrelated lists it is easier to make more people happy, this would reflect in a distribution of partner's rank peaked around the lowest values of rank. Conversely when beauty takes place one has to expect a more spread distribution until the limit case where only beauty takes place where one has to expect a uniform probability. Indeed if U → ∞ all the players have the same list. They can be accomplished according to their own rank and since they are drawn from a uniform probability this results in this limit in a step function for the quantity P (R). Between these two limits, one can observe a transient behaviour where P (R) is a power law in R as shown in Fig.2 .
Another generalisation that we introduce in order to deal with a realistic situation can be obtained by considering a spatial distribution of players and by adding an additional cost for all the marriages that happen at a large distance. In complete analogy to what has been done for the beauty we will define the score of woman w for man m as
where d(m, w) is the euclidean normalised distance between two players arranged on a d − dimensional lattice and α weights this contribution in the score formation. Since the first part of the score takes into account the personal opinions through a random number drawn from a uniform distribution between 0 and 1 we normalise the value of distance by dividing it for the larger value of the distance possible in the system (i.e. in d = 1 for N players we have a maximum of N/2). In this way a value of α = 0 corresponds to the classical case, whilst in the limit of α = 0 the dynamics is dominated by nearest neighbors marriages. In this case we did not found any difference from the classical case for what regards the GS algorithm. Also in this case the man-oriented algorithm and the woman-oriented brings to different stable states more convenient for men and women respectively. The reason for that in our opinion is in the fact that different random lists form different metastable states that GS can explore in the finding of stability. This scenario is destroyed by the presence of correlations that tends to form a common judgement for all the players (at least for those more beautiful that can choose). When distance is taken into account, instead, this new effect does not produce a player that is most beautifulk than the other and that moves for everyone on the top of the lists. What happens iin this cases that for every player one has a subset of the neighbours (and they are different for every player!) that get some advantage in the matching. To show this effect we plotted in Fig.3 how the probability function P ′ (d) to get married with a partner at a distance d varies with α.
We have generalised the classical stable marriage problem to the more realistic situation when correlations are present in the lists and when the effect of spatial distance between players are taken into account. The classical stable marriage problem can be considered a prototype model for the game theory where the concept of Nash equilibrium plays the central role. The game-theoretical definition of stability result in the formation of stable states that are not the globally best solution. We show that the presence of correlation removes the difference in the stable state that is produced when the utility of one kind of player is maximised with respect to the opposite sex players. The presence of correlation in the wish lists reduces the general satisfaction in the system but distributes it in a fairer way. A similar result is found when spatial distance between players is taken into account.
In conclusion our paper shows that in case of more realistic situations the framework of Nash equilibria for the game theory do not necessarily apply. This result in a more conventional search for stable state in the problems of matching.
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